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Recognizing the Public Schools' Authority




"How many more kids have to die?" asked a Boston Globe reader on
January 26, 2010, less than two weeks after fifteen-year-old freshman
Phoebe Prince hanged herself following months of face-to-face bullying
and cyberbullying by classmates at South Hadley High School in South
Hadley, Massachusetts.' By this time, Americans had grown accustomed to
reports of suicides by cyberbullying victims in public elementary and
secondary schools from coast-to-coast.2
Parents, teachers, and other residents in South Hadley did not have to
think hard to jog their memories. Less than a year had passed since eleven-
year-old Carl Joseph Walker-Hoover of nearby Springfield hanged himself
with an electrical cord from a third-floor railing at home after months of
bullying from his New Leadership Charter School classmates. 3 Carl was a
Boy Scout active in sports and his church, but he had also drawn derision
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I. Patricia Hunt, Letter to the Editor, Hold Mirror Up to the Abusers, Bos. GLOBE,
Jan. 26, 2010, at 14.
2. See, e.g., Michael Ollove, Bullying and Teen Suicide: How Do We Adjust School
Climate?, CHRISTIAN SC. MON. (Apr. 29, 2010), http://csmonitor.com[USA/Society/2010/
0428/Bullying-and-teen-suicide-How-do-we-adjust-school-climate.
3. Yvonne Abraham, Two Deaths Too Many, Bos. GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2010, at 1.
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from classmates who called him gay and said he acted like a girl.4
Carl's suicide note expressed love for his family and left his toys and
video games to his six-year-old brother.5 Eleven seems much too young to
attempt to write a will, but Massachusetts public school authorities
evidently learned little from Carl's suicide because the essential
circumstances preceding Phoebe Prince's suicide so soon afterwards bore
close resemblance. As in Carl's case, Phoebe had endured persistent verbal
and physical abuse without meaningful efforts by school authorities to
institute a bullying prevention curriculum, protect the victim, or suspend or
expel the bullies. Teachers and administrators knew that Phoebe, like Carl,
was a constant target because she and her parents said they had approached
the school more than once to seek protection, only to be rebuffed.
Classmates bullied Phoebe Prince in cyberspace until her life became,
according to one media report, "a daily ordeal of extraordinary horrors."7
In a steady stream of text messages and on a Facebook page accessible to
the entire student body, the cyberbullies said she deserved to die and called
her an "Irish slut," a whore, and a druggie.8 After Phoebe's twelve-year-old
sister found her hanging by a scarf in a closet in the family's apartment late
in the afternoon of January 14, 2010,9 Phoebe's tormenters logged onto her
Facebook memorial page and continued mocking her in posthumous
postings.10
The deliberate indifference of teachers and school administrators to the
pleas of Phoebe Prince, Carl Joseph Walker-Hoover, and their parents is
nothing new. Until relatively recently, death or serious injury to a particular
bullying victim might provoke an investigation, arrest, or other fleeting
public reaction to local media coverage, but sustained anti-bullying
initiatives in the public schools gained little traction. Schools did not begin
4. Id.; Sue Hyde, Op-Ed., Breaking the Silence Around Bullying, Bos. GLOBE, Apr.
18, 2009, at 13.
5. James Vaznis, Support Swells for Anti-Bully Legislation, Bos. GLOBE, Nov. 15,
2009, at 1.
6. Abraham, supra note 3; Kevin Cullen, Standing Up For Phoebe, Bos. GLOBE,
Mar. 30, 2010, at 1; Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, Questions for School on Bullying and a
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, at Al; John R. Ellement & Peter Schworm, Prince
Pleaded for Help At School: But Prosecutors Say Officials Sent Her Back to Class, Bos.
GLOBE, Apr. 9, 2010, at 1; O'Ryan Johnson, Cops: Taunted Boy Killed Self Bos. HERALD,
Apr. 10, 2009, at 10; Peter Schworm, School's (sic) Head Defends Response to Bullying:
Rebuts Prosecutor on Teen's Suicide, Bos. GLOBE, Apr. 1, 2010, at 1.
7. Editorial, Criminal Charges Mark a New Seriousness About Bullying, Bos.
GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2010, at 18.
8. Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 6.
9. Nancy Gibbs, When Bullying Goes Criminal, TIMEs, Apr. 19, 2010, available at
http:www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1978773,00.html.
10. Anne K. Ream, What Bullying Says About Us, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 25, 2010, at 23.
182 [Vol. 37: 18 1
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paying closer attention to bullying until two seniors turned bombs and
semi-automatic weapons on classmates at Columbine High School in
Littleton, Colorado on April 20, 1999." The commando-style raid left
twelve students, a teacher, and the two killers dead and two dozen other
victims wounded. 12
Classmates had taunted the two Columbine killers for years, without
intervention by school administrators.13 After the killers' pent-up rage
became public, parents and students told the Colorado Governor's
Columbine Review Commission that "a significant amount of bullying had
occurred" at Columbine, but that "it would have been futile to report
bullying to the school administration because no one there would have
done anything about it."l 4
Bullying had apparently also plagued South Hadley High School for a
generation or more. Shortly after Phoebe Prince's suicide, angry South
Hadley parents came forward to say their children too were being bullied,
but school authorities had turned a deaf ear. 15 Parents demanded the
resignations of the principal and school commissioner for ignoring
Phoebe's pleas for help.16 One father said that a girl who bullied Phoebe
also bullied his daughter for three years; "we continually went to the
administration and we really got no satisfaction," said the father, who later
received an apology from school authorities.' 7 Another father told school
officials at a public meeting about the bullying he had endured at South
Hadley High as a student in the early 1990s.18
I have written before about why face-to-face bullying and cyberbullying
warrant a coordinated public response by the pediatric safety system, the
network essential to protecting children's physical and emotional well-
being.19 The pediatric safety system begins at home with parentS20 but may
11. THE GOVERNOR'S COLUMBINE REVIEW COMM'N, The REPORT OF GOVERNOR BILL
OWENS xxi (2001),http://www.state.co.us/columbine/Columbine 20Report WEB.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 99 n.212
14. Id at 98 n.211.
15. Kevin Cullen, Too Little, Too Late Against Bully Tactics, Bos. GLOBE, Jan. 31,
2010, at 2.
16. Peter Schworm & Milton J. Valencia, Anger Turns Toward Staff in Bullying Case,
Bos. GLOBE, Mar. 31, 2010, at 1.
17. Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, 6 Teenagers are Charged After Classmate's
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at A14.
18. Marie Szaniszlo, Parents Demand Action on Bullying, Bos. HERALD, Jan. 28,
2010, at 6.
19. Douglas E. Abrams, A Coordinated Public Response to School Bullying, in OUR
PROMISE: ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN 399 (Maurice R.
Dyson & Daniel B. Weddle eds., 2009).
20. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (plurality opinion) (quoting
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extend to public authorities such as the school district for public school
students, law enforcement, the juvenile and criminal courts, the state child
protective agency, and perhaps, in extreme cases, the state mental health
agency.21
This article focuses on cyberbullying in the public elementary and
secondary schools, which stand as potentially the most effective public
authorities in the pediatric safety system's response to students' distress.
"Unlike other instruments of the State, schools are entrusted with a unique
role in our society-to mold our children into responsible and wise adult
citizens." 22 Public schools enroll most of the nation's school-age
children, 23 who interact daily during the academic year with teachers and
other school authorities such as administrators, guidance counselors, school
psychologists, and the school nurse or physician. These authorities are
charged not only with classroom teaching, but also with monitoring
attendance, supervising student behavior, and maintaining discipline and
decorum. 24
The public elementary and secondary schools also remain on the front
lines because most cyberbullying pits perpetrators against victims who
know one another largely or entirely from the school's classrooms and
hallways. 25 When cyberbullies target a victim, they normally foresee
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) ("[T]he custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979) ("The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a
child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's
difficult decisions."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (stating that parents
hold the opportunity and responsibility for "inculcation of moral standards ... and elements
of good citizenship").
21. Abrams, supra note 19, at 410-23.
22. In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 742 (Wis. 2001).
23. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 143 tbl.215,
145 tbl.221, 148 tbl.223 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/llstatab/educ.pdf
(concluding that the nation has 74.5 million children under eighteen, nearly 49 million of
whom attended kindergarten through grade twelve in the public schools in 2007);
KATHERINE K. WALLMAN, FORUM ON CHILD AND FAMILY STATISTICS, AMERICA'S CHILDREN
IN BRIEF: KEY NATIONAL INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING, 2010, at 3 (2010),
http://www.childstats.gov/pdf/ac201O/ac_10.pdf.
24. See, e.g., JAMES QUINA, EFFECTIVE SECONDARY TEACHING: GOING BEYOND THE
BELL CURVE 16-17 (1989).
25. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)
("[S]pend the school hours in close association with each other, both in the classroom and
during recreational periods."); Jaana Juvonen & Elisheva F. Gross, Extending the School
Grounds?-Bullying Experiences in Cyberspace, 78 J. SCH. HEALTH 496, 497 (2008)
("[W]hen most schoolmates have Internet access at home, electronic communication is
conducted largely within school-based peer networks." (footnote omitted)).
[Vol. 37:181184
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reaction only from other classmates because they know that hardly any of
the Internet's two billion other users worldwide would have reason to pay
attention.26
"By virtually all accounts, bullying of young people by their peers online
is on the rise." 27 Studies estimate that a third or more of students are
frequently involved in bullying as perpetrators or victims.28 More than 3.2
million students suffer victimization each year in the sixth through tenth
grades alone, comprising nearly one in six children in these grades. 29 Half
of all students suffer varying degrees of bullying at some time before they
leave high school.30 A 2006 national survey found that one-third of all
students between twelve and seventeen, and one-sixth of all younger pre-
teens, have suffered cyberbullying. 31 These disturbing figures may
underestimate the extent of school cyberbullying because some studies find
even higher percentages. 32 Some researchers cite underreporting because
many, and perhaps most, cyberbullied children resist telling adults at
school or home about their plight, fearing their parents might take away
Internet privileges or the cyberbullies might retaliate. 33
26. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding
disciplinary sanction imposed on high school student for blog posting that concerned events
at school, and that the student encouraged her classmates to read and provide responses);
J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) (upholding
discipline imposed by middle school because "the web site was aimed not at a random
audience, but at the specific audience of students and others connected with this particular
School District"); ITUEstimates Two Billion People Online by End 2010, INT'LTELECOMM.
UNION (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/pressreleases/2010/39.
aspx?loc=interstitialskip.
27. JOHN PALFREY, Searching for Solutions to Cyberbullying, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id=21415
(including this article as part of an online symposium of the First Amendment Center Online
titled Cyberbullying & Public Schools).
28. See, e.g., Terry Diamanduros et al., The Role of School Psychologists in the
Assessment, Prevention, and Intervention of Cyberbullying, 45 PSYCHOL. IN THE ScHs. 693,
693 (2008); Martina Stewart, New CNN Poll: 1/3 of Teens Have Been Personally Bullied,
2/3 Report That Friends Have Been Bullied, CNN AC360o BLOG (Oct. 4, 2010, 03:49 PM
ET), http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/04/new-cnn-poll- 13-of-teens-have-been-
personally-bullied-23s-report-that-friends-have-been-bullied/.
29. James Alan Fox & Delbert S. Elliott, Bullying Prevention Is Crime Prevention 2
(2003), http://www.pluk.org/Pubs/Bullying2.pdf.
30. Report 1 of the Council on Scientific Affairs (A-02): Bullying Behaviors Among
Children and Adolescents, AM. MED. Ass'N (2002), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/no-
index/about-ama/14312.page.
31. Op. Research Corp., Cyber Bully-Pre-Teen, FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS 3
(2006), http://www.fightcrime.org/cyberbullying/cyberbullyingpreteen.pdf.
32. Kimberly L. Mason, Cyberbullying: A Preliminary Assessment for School
Personnel, 45 PSYCHOL. IN THE ScHs. 323, 326-27 (2008).
33. See, e.g., Faye Mishna et al., Ongoing and Online: Children and Youth's
185
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These imposing numbers have led the American Medical Association,
the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, and the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to identify school bullying
as a "public health problem." 34 Like several other states since the
Columbine tragedy, Massachusetts has responded with legislation that
prohibits school bullying (including cyberbullying), and requires schools to
adopt prevention curricula, discipline bullies, and cooperate with law
enforcement when bullying turns criminal.
Statewide anti-bullying statutes are only a tentative first step because, as
former Harvard Law School Dean Roscoe Pound said, "[t]he life of the law
is in its enforcement." 36 Pound meant that achieving a statute's protective
purpose depends on sustained public commitment because words on paper
protect no one, and statutes do not apply themselves.
Professional educators may respond to anti-bullying legislation with the
professional and personal commitment that Pound envisioned. For decades,
school authorities did not encourage or condone face-to-face bullyin ,
which would intentionally do repeated harm to someone less powerful
through assaults, words, ostracism, or teasing.3 8 Few school authorities
Perceptions of Cyber Bullying, 31 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1222, 1225-26 (2009);
see also SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. ET AL., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL
CRIME AND SAFETY: 2010, at 42 (2010), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011002.pdf
(indicating that only thirty-six percent of students bullied in school reported the incident to
teachers or administrators); Christine Oliver & Mano Candappa, Bullying and the Politics of
"Telling," 33 OxFORD REV. EDUC. 71, 71 (2007) (showing that student victims' resistance
to report bullying increases with age).
34. Victoria Stagg Elliott, AMA Recognizes Bullying As Public Health Problem, AM.
MED. NEWS (July 16, 2001), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/07/09/hlsa0709.htm;
Youth Violence: Electronic Aggression, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/youthviolence/electronicaggression/index.html
(last visited May 31, 2011); Press Release, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Bullying Widespread in
U.S. Schools, Survey Finds (Apr. 24, 2001), http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/apr2001/nichd-
24.htm; see also, e.g., UNICEF, PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM VIOLENCE IN SPORT: A
REVIEW WITH A Focus ON INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 9 (2010), http://www.
unicef.ca/portal/Secure/Community/502/WCM/Reports/UNICEF violence insport.pdf
(suggesting that bullying without meaningful intervention efforts by a nation's pediatric
safety system may violate the child victim's human rights under international law); Jorge C.
Srabstein & Bennett L. Leventhal, Prevention of Bullying-Related Morbidity and Mortality:
A Callfor Public Health Policies, 88 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 403, 403 (2010) (calling
school bullying a "major public health problem" and a "psychosocial hazard" worldwide)..
35. Abrams, supra note 19, at 405.
36. Roscoe Pound, Note, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 619
(1908).
37. Fox & Elliott, supra note 29, at 5.
38. See Mason, supra note 32, at 323; see also RANA SAMPSON, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BULLYING IN SCHOOLS 2-3 (2002), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/el2011405.pdf;
Wendy M. Craig, The Relationship Among Bullying, Victimization, Depression, Anxiety,
186 [Vol. 37:181
HeinOnline  -- 37 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 186 2011
2011] AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE OFF-CAMPUS BULLYING
today would encourage or condone cyberbullying on the Internet and other
virtual forums, "the bully's new playground."3 9 Educators can empathize
with the emotional and physical toll that torrential abuse can exact on a
child through email, instant messaging, blogs, social networking sites, or
even websites featuring the victim.
Educators' empathy, however, can carry the mandates of statewide anti-
bullying legislation only so far. The commitment to enforce these mandates
may weaken because disciplining students nowadays may expose teachers
and school administrators to adverse personal and professional
consequences. Commentators have argued persuasively that school
authorities often avoid meaningful discipline because they fear that the
students and their parents will respond with litigation claiming rights
violations.40 In a Harris Interactive poll, 82% of teachers and 77% of
principals said that fear of lawsuits has led them to assume a "defensive
teaching mode," motivated by desire to avoid being sued.41 Seventy-eight
percent of teachers said students reminded them that they have rights or
their parents could sue, and 62% of principals said parents have threatened
them with legal action. 42
One commentator explains:
The prospect of a lawsuit, with its resulting publicity, expense, and
unpleasantness, is hardly one that will be relished by either teacher or
school administrator, even if the school and teacher are ultimately
vindicated. Indeed, a threat by a student or parent, even if it is based on
a groundless claim and falls short of a formal lawsuit, is an extremely
disagreeable experience that most teachers and school administrators
will attempt to avoid if at all possible.43
Even the most carefully crafted anti-cyberbullying legislation will likely
and Aggression in Elementary School Children, 24 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 123, 123 (1998); Dan Olweus, Bullying at School: Basic Facts and Effects of
a School Based Intervention Program, 35 J. CHID PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1171, 1172
(1994); J.P. Piek et al., The Relationship Between Bullying and Self-Worth in Children with
Movement Coordination Problems, 75 BRIT. J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 453, 454 (2005).
39. Bob Meadows et al., The Web: The Bully's New Playground, PEOPLE (Mar. 14,
2005), http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20147083,00.html; see also JANIS
WOLAK ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, ONLINE
VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER 42 (2006), http://www.missing
kids.com/enUS/publications/NC167.pdf ("Nasty comments and sexual innuendoes are no
longer confined to a bathroom wall or small groups of peers. Now bullies have an
'electronic bathroom wall' that allows for widespread distribution of gossip.").
40. See, e.g., Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights?
Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 94-95 (1996).
41. Tresa Baldas, School Suits, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 2004, at 1.
42. Id
43. Dupre, supra note 40 (footnote omitted).
187
HeinOnline  -- 37 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 187 2011
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CONFINEMENT
not achieve its protective purposes until elementary and secondary
educators feel greater confidence in their legal authority to discipline
cyberbullies, by suspension or expulsion if necessary. Because strength
must come from the top, this confidence depends first on the school board's
steadfast support of disciplinary efforts, even when litigation beckons.
Confidence also depends on the disciplinarian's expectation that courts
will uphold sanctions by applying Supreme Court doctrine, which for the
past several decades has systematically strengthened and reaffirmed the
public schools' constitutional authority to discipline students for
misconduct. In the Supreme Court, no disciplined student has won a
constitutional challenge against school authorities in more than forty
years.44 This article sets out the Supreme Court doctrine and provides a
blueprint for both schools and courts.
A. The First Amendment Claim
When cyberbullies and their parents challenge a disciplinary sanction,
they generally raise one or both of two primary claims. First, because
cyberbullying is accomplished largely or entirely by statements of opinion,
challengers argue the words are protected by the First Amendment. 41 In the
greater society, the First Amendment accords considerable protection to
statements of opinion in the "free trade in ideas." 46 For decades, however,
the Supreme Court held that students' First Amendment expressive rights
in school are less weighty than the First Amendment expressive rights
adults enjoy on the outside. The Justices recognize that "'special needs'
inhere in the public school context,' 4 7 where "the State is responsible for
maintaining discipline, health, and safety.'4 8
Part II of this article explores the First Amendment doctrine that began
in earnest with the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.49 Tinker provides the public
schools two related but distinct grounds for disciplining cyberbullying and
other student expression consistent with the First Amendment. Schools
may discipline student expression that causes, or reasonably threatens, (1)
"substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities,"50
44. See infra notes 87-152 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 4, 8 and accompanying text; infra notes 69-152, 218 and
accompanying text.
46. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[Tihe ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.").
47. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 843 (2002) (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 830.
49. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
50. Id. at 514.
188 [Vol. 37:18 1
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or (2) "collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let
alone." 51
Tinker neither provided a formula for determining what qualifies as
substantial or material, nor explored the nature of other students' rights the
decision recognized. The decision's Supreme Court progeny, however,
have helped fill the void.52 As a threshold matter, these decisions
distinguished Tinker's political expression from student expression that
(like virtually all cyberbullying) expresses no viewpoint on politics or
public affairs, "the core of what the First Amendment is designed to
protect."5 3 In the face of actual or reasonably threatened disruption or
rights collision, public school students' non-political expression receives
only diminished First Amendment protection.
The post-Tinker Supreme Court decisions have also conferred broad
discretion on public school authorities to determine when student speech
threatens or creates the requisite disruption or rights collision. To fulfill
their "basic educational mission,"54 school authorities may exercise this
discretion to discipline student speech that compromises efforts to teach
"the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior,"55 "habits and manners of
civility," 56 and respect for "the sensibilities of fellow students."57
Social science research findings provide an ample basis for determining,
on an appropriate record, that particular acts of cyberbullying threaten or
create the requisite rights collision by compromising the safety and security
of students in school.s Such findings also provide predicates for
determining that by its very nature, cyberbullying transcends acceptable
social boundaries through incivility that assaults the sensibilities of targeted
students, and sometimes of much or all of the student body. As a leading
First Amendment scholar puts it, cyberbullying constitutes "a most venal
and intolerable abuse of the freedom of speech that Internet users enjoy"59
through messages that serve little or no purpose other than to torment a
targeted classmate.
51. Id. at 508.
52. See infra notes 87-152 and accompanying text.
53. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 365 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986).
55. Id. at 682.
56. Id. at 681.
57. Id.
58. See infra notes 188-244 and accompanying text.
59. Cyberbullying and Other Online Safety Issues for Children: Hearing on H.R.
1966 and H.R. 3630 Before the H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security, 111th Cong. 42 (2009) (statement by Robert M. O'Neil, Director of the Thomas
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression).
189
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B. The Territorial Claim
Parents and the disciplined cyberbully may also argue that public
schools lack authority to impose discipline for messages sent from off
school grounds, for example, from the cyberbully's cell phone, or from a
computer keyboard in the home. As Part III of this article describes,
however, schools acting in accordance with Tinker's two-prong holding
may also overcome this territorial claim. Most lower courts have held that
where the cyberbully could have foreseen that the message would
materially and substantially disrupt school activities, or would compromise
the security of one or more identified classmates known to the cyberbully,
the school may impose discipline as if the message had originated on
campus.60 The message's off-campus origins are not determinative because
"[w]ithout a safe and secure environment, a school is unable to fulfill its
basic purpose of providing an education."61
The territorial claim may also implicate Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser, a leading post-Tinker student-speech decision.62 Without
applying Tinker's two-prong test, Fraser upheld the high school's First
Amendment authority to suspend a student for delivering a "lewd,"
"indecent," and "vulgar" speech in an assembly attended by several
hundred classmates.63 In the few decisions reaching the question, lower
courts have assumed or held that Fraser reaches only on-campus speech.6
These assumptions and holdings overlook lessons learned following the
Supreme Court's 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States, which held
that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the government from placing
remote telephone wiretaps.65 Olmstead found no constitutional violation
because "[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."66
Nearly forty years later, the Court vindicated Justice Louis D. Brandeis'
Olmstead dissent from the five-Justice majority's refusal to apply existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine to technological advances wrought by the
telephone.67 Because "[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new
60. See infra notes 253-289 and accompanying text.
61. Cobb v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 619 S.E.2d 274, 289 (W. Va. 2005)
(citation omitted); see also Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 614 (5th Cir.
2004) ("[B]alanc[ing] the First Amendment rights of students with the special need of
educators to maintain a safe and effective learning environment." (footnote omitted)).
62. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
63. Id. at 685.
64. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
65. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
66. Id. at 464.
67. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967)
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conditions and purposes," Justice Brandeis argued, "a principle to be vital
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth."68 In Berger v. New York in 1967, the Court overruled Olmstead and
acknowledged that "[tjhe law ... has not kept pace with ... advances in
scientific knowledge."'
Where cyberbullies foresee that their off-campus speech will reach
classmates on campus, courts remain true to Fraser by applying its express
holding to technology that the Supreme Court had no reason to anticipate
when it decided that case in 1986.70 By keeping pace with technological
advances as Justice Brandeis advised, courts applying Fraser would
provide schools significant constitutional authority to discipline
cyberbullying, which frequently degenerates into lewdness, indecency, or
vulgarity before long.
II. PUBLIC SCHOOLS' CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
TO DISCIPLINE CYBERBULLYING
On an appropriate record, Supreme Court doctrine enables public
schools to overcome the defense frequently asserted by disciplined
cyberbullies and their parents that cyber messages constitute expression
protected by the First Amendment.
A. Bullying that Holds No First Amendment Protection
Cyberbullies using contemporary technology can physically assault the
victim at school, or communicate actual or virtual "true threats" of physical
assaults.7 1 The First Amendment does not constrain public schools from
disciplining cyberbullies for assaults or true threats, regardless of any other
arguably protected speech the cyberbully might also have uttered.72
68. Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 885 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment, as with other parts of the
Constitution, must deal with new problems in a changing world.").
69. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967).
70. See infra notes 267-80 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Juvonen & Gross, supra note 25, at 497; Larry Magid, Magid on Tech:
The Reality of Cyberbullying, SAN JOSE MERCuRy NEWS, July 14, 2009 (discussing study
that found that 85% of students bullied online were also bullied at school) (accessible
through LexisNexis online database).
72. Cf Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 983 n.4 (11th Cir. 2007)
(upholding student's suspension for writing a story describing her dream to shoot a
particular teacher in front of the other students; the student "was also punished for her
clearly insubordinate behavior, and it may well have been within the school's discretion to
suspend or expel [her] for her disrespectful conduct alone").
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1. Assaults and true threats
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell in 1993, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "a
physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment."n. .. "[V]iolence or other types of
potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from
their communicative impact ... are entitled to no constitutional
protection." 74 Mitchell means that cyberbullies gain no First Amendment
sanctuary when words accompany a blow or other physical violence
delivered face-to-face.
The Supreme Court has similarly held that "[t]hreats of violence are
outside the First Amendment." 75 In Virginia v. Black in 2003, the Court
reiterated that true-threats "encompass those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." 76
"The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat" because "a
prohibition on true threats 'protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence'
and 'from the disruption that fear engenders,' in addition to protecting
people 'from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.' 77
Phoebe Prince likely endured both assaults and true threats. Students
reported that they saw her being pushed and shoved in South Hadley High
School's hallways and classrooms, watched a teacher console her as she
wept, and saw her crying in the nurse's office a few hours before she
hanged herself 7 8 Phoebe told a friend that she was "not a tough girl" and
"would not know how to fight," and sometimes asked friends to surround
her as she walked from class to class. 79 Prosecutors also alleged that when
73. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); see also United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (explaining that where conduct involves elements of
speech, the First Amendment permits the state to punish the conduct, if the punishment "is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest").
74. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
76. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 359-60 (citation omitted); see also Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 684
F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1122 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (stating that when a student transmits a threat to
kill named students, a court determining the reasonableness of a target's reaction may
consider "the school tragedies during the past two decades and their effect on students and
school administrators").
78. Ellement & Schworm, supra note 6; Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 6.
79. Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, Court Documents Detail a Teenage Girl's Final
Days ofFear and Bullying, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 9, 2010, at A12.
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she told a school administrator a week before her death that she was
"scared and wanted to go home" to avoid a beating from a classmate, the
administrator dismissed her pleas and sent her back to class.80
2. "Fighting words"
Related to true threats is the "fighting words" doctrine, which denies
First Amendment protection to statements that "by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."" The
Supreme Court announced the doctrine in 1942 in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, which unanimously upheld the conviction of a Jehovah's
Witness for a street corner speech that aroused some listeners in the
crowd.82
The Court has never overruled Chaplinsky, but has declined to apply
the "fighting words" doctrine to sustain a conviction in any case it has
reviewed since that decision. 83 The Court's evident discomfort stems
perhaps from the doctrine's capacity to enable law enforcement to silence
the speaker, rather than to restrain the heckler who professes hurt
sensibilities or otherwise threatens to disturb the peace. 84
The "fighting words" doctrine occasionally surfaces in student-speech
cases,8 5 and the bullies' face-to-face challenges to Phoebe Prince at school
may have included expression that qualified. Since Chaplinsky, however,
the Court has restricted the doctrine's reach to expression that is "directed
to the person of the hearer," 86 or that amounts to "a direct personal insult or
an invitation to exchange fisticuffs." 87
These "face-to-face" restrictions leave little room for applying the
"fighting words" doctrine to cyberbullying unless courts recognize virtual
confrontation as actionable after seventy-plus years of Supreme Court
decisions declining to sustain fighting-words convictions. The courts'
approach to Chaplinsky may hold little practical consequence, however,
because as the Second Circuit has concluded, the Tinker Doctrine grants
the public schools broad First Amendment authority to discipline
80. Ellement & Schworm, supra note 6.
81. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
82. Id. at 574.
83. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 670-71
(7th Cir. 2008) ("[S]ubsequent invocations of the [Chaplinsky] doctrine have failed."
(citation omitted)); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1002 (3d ed. 2006).
84. See, e.g., Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First
Amendment, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 629, 632-36 (1985).
85. See, e.g., Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 670.
86. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (citation omitted).
87. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (citations omitted).
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cyberbullies for almost any student expression that might fairly be
characterized as fighting words (or as true threats).
B. The Tinker Doctrine
1. Tinker's antecedents: Barnette (1943), Prince (1944), and
Brown (1954)
The Tinker Doctrine's immediate pedigree began with landmark
decisions grounded in two core propositions that remain central to what the
Supreme Court has called our nation's "dependence on public schools." 89
First, the pre-Tinker decisions established that children hold constitutional
rights in disputes with the state, but specified that these rights are subject to
greater limitation than similar constitutional rights held by adults.90
Second, the decisions laid the groundwork for holdings which established
that children's constitutional rights are particularly subject to limitation in
the public schools, whose role in educating youth and transmitting values
of citizenshi, depends on maintaining a safe and secure learning
environment.
Tinker's first direct Supreme Court antecedent was West Virginia State
Board ofEducation v. Barnette (1943), which upheld the right of Jehovah's
Witnesses schoolchildren, under the First Amendment speech clause, to
refuse to salute the flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance, state-imposed
obligations that the children and their parents contended were acts of
idolatry that violated Biblical commands. 92 Barnette specified that the
Constitution "protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures-Boards of Education not excepted." 93 Justice Robert H.
Jackson, writing for the majority, explained that school boards "are
educating the young for citizenship."9 4
A year after Barnette, the Court decided Prince v. Massachusetts, which
upheld the state's child labor law against a challenge grounded in First
88. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007).
89. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977) (footnote omitted).
90. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text,
91. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
92. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see, e.g.,
Douglas E. Abrams, Justice Jackson and the Second Flag-Salute Case: Reason and Passion
in Opinion-Writing, 36 J. SUP. CT. HiST. 30, 30 (2011).
93. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (noting that Boards of Education have "important,
delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights"); see also, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637
(2007) (Alito, J., concurring) ("The public schools are invaluable and beneficent
institutions, but they are, after all, organs of the State.").
94. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
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Amendment defenses of religious freedom.95 Prince recognized that
children hold constitutional rights, but permitted states to limit these rights
because "[t]he state's authority over children's activities is broader than
over like actions of adults." 96 The Court specified that "[w]hat may be
wholly permissible for adults . . . may not be so for children, either with or
without their parents' presence." 97 As in Barnette, citizenship education
could help tip the scales in favor of state authority: "A democratic society
rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young
people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies."9
A decade after Prince, the Court again stressed citizenship education in
Brown v. Board of Education, which unanimously held that racial
segregation in the public schools denied African American children equal
protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.99 Brown recognized
public education as "a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment."100
2. Tinker (1969)
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District upheld
the First Amendment rights of public elementary and secondary school
students to wear black armbands in school as a silent, non-disruptive
protest of the Vietnam War. 101 The peaceful protest would have been
secure from content-based restriction on Main Street, but the Court held
95. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944).
96. Id. at 168; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (plurality opinion)
("A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the
Constitution, [however,] . . . the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with
those of adults .... ); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Minors, as
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.")
(citations omitted); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 591 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)
("[T]here are differences which must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties
of children as compared with those of adults.") (emphasis in original); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 13 (1967) ("[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."); Prince, 321 U.S. at 173 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("[T]he power of the state
lawfully to control ... activities of children is greater than its power over similar activities
of adults.").
97. Prince, 321 U.S. at 169.
98. Id. at 168; see also id. at 177 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[State-imposed] limits
begin to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of others or of
the public.").
99. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
100. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (quoting Brown,
347 U.S. at 493).
101. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969).
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that the public schools presented a different constitutional calculus.
On the one hand, Justice Abe Fortas wrote for the Tinker majority: "First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment, are available to ... students. It can hardly be argued
that ... students ... shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."l 02 On the other hand, students'
expressive rights are limited by the "comprehensive authority of the States
and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."103
Tinker held that the First Amendment permits school authorities to
discipline student expression that undermines one or both of two state
interests, one grounded in maintaining the overall educational environment,
and the other grounded in protecting the personal rights of other students.
The dispositive questions are whether the record yields evidence of
"interference, actual or nascent, with the schools' work or of collision with
the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone." 04
Tinker concluded that "conduct by the student, in class or out of it,
which for any reason ... materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech." 05 The
student armband wearers prevailed in Tinker, but only because the record
did not demonstrate "speech or action that intrude[d] upon the work of the
schools or the rights of other students." 06
3. Tinker's First Amendment progeny
In the more than four decades since Tinker, "every Supreme Court
decision looking at student speech has expanded the kinds of speech
schools can regulate." 0 7 The Court has reaffirmed the seminal decision's
102. Id. at 506.
103. Id. at 507 (citations omitted); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341,
343 (1985) (discussing "the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to
maintain order in the schools," in furtherance of "the legitimate end of preserving order in
the schools").
104. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
105. Id. at 513.
106. Id. at 508. The students' silent protest "failfed] to yield evidence that the school
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students." Id. at
509. The Court followed by explaining that schools may impose discipline for student
speech that "materially disrupts classwork or . . . 'materially and substantially interfer[es]
with the requirement of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."' Id. at 513
(quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
107. Palmer ex rel Palmer v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502, 507 (5th
Cir. 2009).
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vitality while creating three exceptions that permit school authorities to
discipline student speech even without proof of the disruption or rights
collision that Tinker's two-prong holding recited.
i. Fraser (1986)
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court cited Tinker and
upheld the high school's authority to suspend a student for delivering an
"offensively lewd and indecent," "vulgar" speech laden with "an elaborate,
graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor" in an assembly attended by about
600 students. 0 8 The First Amendment would have protected the expression
in the greater society,109 but the Court held that the assembly speech
enjoyed more limited First Amendment protection because the
constitutional rights of public school students "are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.""o The Court
acknowledged that "[t]he First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in
matters of adult public discourse[,]" but rejected the disciplined student's
contention that "the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public
school."' 1
The Court did not apply Tinker's two-prong test. "Unlike the sanctions
imposed ... in Tinker," wrote Chief Justice Warren E. Burger for Fraser's
majority, "the penalties imposed [on the student] were unrelated to any
political viewpoint."ll 2 Fraser's dispositive issue instead was that the
student's non-political speech impeded the school's central role in
citizenship education, a prime focus of Barnette, Prince, and Brown
decades earlier.
"[E]ducating our youth for citizenship in public schools," the Chief
Justice explained at length, "is not confined to books, the curriculum, or
civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized
social order."11 3 "Fundamental values of public school education...
"must ... take into account consideration of the sensibilities of ... fellow
students."ll 4 Students' First Amendment expressive rights in school are
tempered by "society's countervailing interest in teaching students the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.""l The "basic educational
mission"11 6 emphasizes teaching the "habits and manners of civility." 17
108. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 408 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678, 683-85 (1986).
109. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007).
110. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 685.
113. Id. at 683.
114. Id. at 681.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 685.
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The First Amendment permitted the school to discipline the student's
assembly speech, the Chief Justice continued, because "'fundamental
values' . . .' disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly
threatening to others. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from
insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to
sanctions. The inculcation of these values is truly the 'work of the
schools."" 18
Fraser concluded that "[t]he determination of what manner of
speech ... is inappropriate properly rests with the school board," and not
with the federal courts.1 19 To underscore this conclusion, the Court quoted,
as "especially relevant in this case," a passage from Justice Hugo L.
Black's forceful dissent in Tinker.120 Justice Black rejected arguments that
"the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school
officials to surrender control of the American public school system to
public school students."1 21
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in Fraser's judgment "in light
of the discretion school officials have to teach high school students how to
conduct civil and effective public discourse, and to prevent disruption of
school educational activities."1 22 Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, but
he too agreed that "a school faculty must regulate the content as well as the
style of student speech in carrying out its educational mission," 23 and that
"the school-not the student-must prescribe the rules of conduct in an
educational institution."1 24
117. Id. at 681 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-
77 (1979) (stating that the public schools play an important role "in the preparation of
individuals for participation as citizens," and inculcates "fundamental values necessary to
the maintenance of a democratic political system").
118. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
119. Id.; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-64 (1982) (plurality opinion)
("[Llocal school boards have broad discretion in the management of school affairs, ... [but]
the discretion of the States and local school boards in matters of education must be
exercised in a manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the First
Amendment." (citations omitted)); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 594 (1975) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("One of the more disturbing aspects of today's decision is its indiscriminate
reliance upon the judiciary, and the adversary process, as the means of resolving many of
the most routine problems arising in the classroom."); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104 (1968) ("Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation
raises problems requiring care and restraint. . . . By and large, public education in our
Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.").
120. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686.
121. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Black,
J., dissenting).
122. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
124. Id. at 692 (citing Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens,
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ii. Kuhlmeier (1988)
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court cited Tinker and
Fraser and upheld the high school principal's authority to remove two
articles (one about teenage pregnancy and the other about divorce) before
they were published in a school newspaper that was funded by the board of
education and produced as part of the school's journalism curriculum.125
The state's pre-publication removal from an ordinary newspaper would
constitute a prior restraint prohibited by the First Amendment. 126
Kuhlmeier rejected the First Amendment claims of the newspaper's three
student staff members, however, without applying Tinker's two-prong
holding. Because the newspaper was produced as part of the school's
journalism curriculum, the dispositive issue was that "members of the
public might reasonably perceive [it] to bear the imprimatur of the
school."l127
Kuhlmeier quoted Brown's instruction about citizenship education and
reaffirmed the public schools' broad authority to limit student speech that
threatens or compromises the schools' efforts to inculcate values: 128
"[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns." 1 29 Judicial intervention is warranted only
when editorial control "has no valid educational purpose,"l 30 a restrictive
standard that students are unlikely ever to satisfy.
Kuhlmeier reiterated the Court's "oft-expressed view that the education
of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers,
and state and local officials, and not of federal judges."' 1 The reiteration
came with particular force because the Court quoted, and found "equally
relevant to the instant case,"' 32 the passage from Justice Black's Tinker
dissent that Fraser had quoted two years earlier.133
J., dissenting)).
125. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262-63, 266-67, 276 (1988).
126. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717, 723-244 (1971);
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 737-38 (1931).
127. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.
128. Id. at 272.
129. Id. at 273.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590 (1975)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("Such an approach properly recognizes the unique nature of public
education and the correspondingly limited role of the judiciary in its supervision.").
132. Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. at 271-72 n.4.
133. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Black,
J., dissenting); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 408 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986)
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iii. Morse (2007)
In Morse v. Frederick, the Court cited Tinker with approval and upheld
the suspension of a high school senior for unfurling, during a school-
sanctioned and school-supervised event, a large banner ("BONG HiTS 4
JESUS") that the school's principal reasonably regarded as promoting
illegal drug use or possession. 134 The Court concluded that Fraser and
Kuhlmeier "confirm[] that the rule of Tinker is not the only basis for
restricting student speech."13 5 Without applying Tinker's two-prong
holding, Morse upheld the school's First Amendment authority to impose
discipline "to safeguard those entrusted to their care"1 36 from messages
promoting drug use or possession, conduct which "can cause severe and
permanent damage to the health and well-being of young people." 37
As in Fraser, the distinction between political and non-political student
speech loomed large. Morse distinguished the student's "bong hits" banner
from the message that the Tinker armband wearers sought to convey, which
"implicat[ed] concerns at the heart of the First Amendment"' 38-political
speech, which is "at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to
protect."139 Morse classified the banner as non-political speech that
contributed nothing to the "political debate over the criminalization of drug
use or possession."l40
4. Tinker's Fourth Amendment progeny
The Tinker Doctrine's First Amendment approach to schoolchildren's
expressive rights has provided bases for strengthening limits on students'
Fourth Amendment rights arising from searches of their persons or
property by public school authorities. The Court's Fourth Amendment
approach to searches of students' persons and property in school, in turn,
has provided bases for strengthening limits on public school students' First
Amendment expressive rights under the Tinker Doctrine.
i. TL.O. (1985)
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court cited Tinker and held that
the Fourth Amendment validity of a public school administrator's in-school
search of a student depends on the search's reasonableness under the
(quoting Justice Black).
134. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2624, 2629 (2007).
135. Id. at 406 (footnote omitted).
136. Id. at 397.
137. Id. at 407.
138. Id. at 403.
139. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion)).
140. Id.
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circumstances, and not on probable cause or a warrant. 14 1 T.L.O. limited
students' Fourth Amendment rights because "preservation of order and a
proper educational environment requires close supervision of
schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that
would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult." 42
ii. Acton (1995) and Earls (2002)
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court cited T.L.O. and
rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to the public school district's
policy that authorized random urinalysis drug testing of its interscholastic
athletes, including athletes whom the district had no reason to suspect of
drug use. 143 Vernonia reiterated Tinker's instruction that children do not
"shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate"'" but
specified that "the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children
in school."l 45
Vernonia explained that children's "Fourth Amendment rights, no less
than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools
than elsewhere."' 46 "The nature of [the State's power over schoolchildren]
is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that
could not be exercised over free adults."l47
The Court extended Vernonia in Board of Education v. Earls, which
upheld a public school district's random suspicionless drug testing policy
for students in all competitive extracurricular activities. 48 Earls cited
Tinker and specified that students' constitutional rights ma be limited
because "'special needs' inhere in the public school context," 19 'where the
State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety."15 0
"Securing order in the school environment sometimes requires that students
be subjected to greater controls than those appropriate for adults"15 1
141. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
142. Id. at 339.
143. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660-65 (1995).
144. Id. at 655-56 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
145. Id. at 656 (citation omitted).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 655; see also, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Certainly, the unique
environment of the school places substantial limits on the extent to which official decisions
may be restrained by First Amendment values.").
148. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-39 (2002).
149. Id. at 829 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 653).
150. Id. at 830.
151. Id. at 831.
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because "the school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment
by other children." 52
iii. Redding (2009)
In Safford Unified School District v. Redding, the Court applied TL.O.
and held that on the facts of the case, the school violated the Fourth
Amendment rights of a thirteen-year-old middle school girl whom it strip-
searched on suspicion that she was hiding a few over-the-counter and
prescription medications in her undergarments.' 53 The student denied the
charge, and the search turned up no contraband.154 Redding restated that
"standards of conduct for schools are for school administrators to
determine without second-guessing by courts lacking the experience to
appreciate what may be needed,"'1 and reemphasized "the high degree of
deference that courts must pay to the educator's professional judgment." 56
C. Applying Tinker to Cyberbullying
For forty years after Tinker, school authorities won every Supreme Court
constitutional case brought by a student. It took a middle school's
misguided strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl to finally break the string
in 2009.'15
1. The dual foundations
Two foundations, one grounded in judicial deference and the other in the
nature of First Amendment concerns, enhance the public schools' authority
to overcome First Amendment challenges to disciplinary sanctions imposed
on students who cyberbully their classmates. As applied in the lower
courts, these foundations invigorate the Court's instruction that "the nature
of [students' constitutional] rights is what is appropriate for children in
school,"15 8 where "'special needs' inhere" 59 because "the school has the
obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children." 60
152. Id. (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring)).
153. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638, 2643-44
(2009).
154. Id. at 2638.
155. Id. at 2640 n.1 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342, n.9).
156. Id. at 2643.
157. Id. at 2644.
158. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995); see also, e.g., J.S. v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. 2002) ("[T]he school setting is unique,
perhaps even sui generis.").
159. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-30 (2002) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist.,
515 U.S. at 653; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40).
160. Earls, at 831 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring)).
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i. "[T]he high degree of deference ... ."161
Fraser and Kuhlmeier instruct that determining the appropriateness of
disciplinary sanctions imposed on student expression is primarily the
responsibility of parents, teachers, and public school officials, and not of
federal judges in constitutional litigation.162 A public school student's
asserted speech rights, explained the Eleventh Circuit, "should not interfere
with a school administrator's professional observation that certain
expressions have led to, and therefore could lead to, an unhealthy and
potentially unsafe learning environment for the children they serve."1 3 The
Seventh Circuit confers considerable First Amendment deference because
"judges are incompetent to tell school authorities how to run schools in a
way that will preserve an atmosphere conducive to learning,"164 and
because "[m]utual respect and forbearance enforced by the school may well
be essential to the maintenance of a minimally decorous atmosphere for
learning."l 65
The Third Circuit has held that school authorities' discretion is reatest
when a student's non-political speech threatens that atmosphere. 6 The
Seventh Circuit explains that schools may discipline some speech that
would be constitutionally protected on Main Street because "high-school
students are not adults, schools are not public meeting halls, children are in
school to be taught by adults rather than to practice attacking each other
with wounding words, and school authorities have a protective relationship
and responsibility to all the students." 67
161. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643.
162. See supra notes 115-17, 127-29 and accompanying text.
163. Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 983 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cnty., 324 F.3d 1246, 1247 (1 1th Cir. 2003)). "Short of a
constitutional violation based on a school administrator's unsubstantiated infringement on a
student's speech or other expressions, this Court will not interfere with the administration of
a school." Id. (quoting Scott, 324 F.3d at 1247).
164. Nuxoll ex rel Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir.
2008).
165. Id. at 672.
166. S.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417, 419, 421-22 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
that the school did not violate the kindergartner's First Amendment rights by suspending
him for saying "I am going to shoot you" to a classmate in the playground during recess).
The court noted that "the determination of what manner of speech is inappropriate properly
rests with school officials." Id.
167. Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 674-75; see also, e.g., Wofford v. Evans, 390 F.3d 318, 323
(4th Cir. 2004) ("[S]chool officials have been afforded substantial leeway to depart from the
prohibitions and procedures that the Constitution provides for society at large. . . . Such
leeway is particularly necessary when school discipline is involved."); id. at 324 ("[T]he
balance or rights and interests to be struck in the disciplinary process is a task best left to
local school systems, operating, as they do, within the parameters of state law."); Bear v.
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Judicial deference, however, has its limits. Without applying Tinker's
two-prong test, that decision's Supreme Court progeny have authorized
First Amendment limitations on three categories of non-political student
expression-lewd, indecent or vulgar speech (Fraser); school-sponsored or
school-funded speech the public might reasonably perceive to bear the
school's imprimatur (Kuhlmeier); and speech that clashes with school rules
about illicit drug use or possession (Morse).
The broad citizenship-education language of Kuhlmeier, Morse, and
particularly Fraser, however, transcended the particular facts of each case.
Some lower courts have applied this language to uphold imposition of
school discipline on other categories of non-political student expression
that, while not reasonably characterized as lewd, indecent, or vulgar, run
afoul of "socially acceptable methods of discourse."1 68 The public schools'
First Amendment authority is more limited in cases concerning arguably
political speech. 169
The more prudent approach, however, taken by many lower court
decisions cited in this article, is to apply this broad Supreme Court
language to help explain the rationale for disposition under one or more of
the Tinker Doctrine's existing holdings, and not to grant public schools
First Amendment authority to determine when citizenship education
supports disciplinary authority over yet new categories of student
speech. 170 Part III will explain why, in accordance with their terms and in
Fleming, 714 F. Supp. 2d 972, 984-85 (D.S.D. 2010) (stating courts should "tread carefully
in the realm of school policy"); in re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Wis. 2001)
(reversing the delinquency adjudication on First Amendment grounds and upholding a
school's suspension of an eighth grader who wrote a story expressing hostility toward his
teacher and depicted a student beheading her with a machete).
168. In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 743; see also, e.g., Sayreville Bd of Educ., 333
F.3d at 420 (student said, "I'm going to shoot you," to friends in the playground during
recess); Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding
the school's authority to prohibit students from wearing Marilyn Manson t-shirts because
the court of appeals found that the Goth rock band's t-shirt featured "symbols and words
that promote values that are . . . patently contrary to the school's educational mission,"
including suicide, murder, and racially derogatory terms); Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ., 380 F.
Supp. 2d 891, 902 (W.D. Mich. 2005) ("Insubordinate speech always interrupts the
educational process [under Tinker] because it is contrary to principles of civility and respect
that are fundamental to a public school education.").
169. See, e.g., Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 321-22 (2d. Cir. 2006)
(limiting Fraser and Kuhlmeier to their facts and upholding high school student's right to
wear t-shirt reading "George W. Bush, Chicken-Hawk-In-Chief' and criticizing his alleged
drug and alcohol abuse); DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633, 644
(D.N.J. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs had reasonable probability of success on the merits of
their claim that they had a First Amendment right to wear buttons featuring photograph of
members of the Hitler Youth to protest the school district's mandatory uniform policy).
170. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008); Evans, 390 F.3d
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light of evolving technology, the holdings of Tinker and its progeny may be
applied not only to on-campus student speech, but also to off-campus
speech (such as cyberbullying) that foreseeably had the requisite harmful
effects in school. The question whether to create additional exceptions to
Tinker, however, is best left to the Supreme Court itself.171
ii. "[C]oncerns at the heart of the First Amendment... ."172
Tinker's Supreme Court progeny directs that as non-political speech,
student cyberbullying deserves comparatively little First Amendment
protection when schools fulfill their "custodial and tutelary"173 obligations
to maintain a non-disruptive, safe, and secure environment conducive to
learning.174 Tinker, Fraser, and Morse yield a political-nonpolitical
distinction readily perceptible on the facts of those cases. Tinker's Vietnam
War protest clearly concerned a matter of spirited public debate and
profound national discord; Fraser's assembly speech laced with sexual
innuendo and Morse's "BONG HiTS" banner itself (which the disciplined
student himself argued was "just nonsense meant to attract television
cameras")175 bore no resemblance to public affairs.
Like so many other distinctions in law, however, the distinction between
political and non-political student speech can sometimes be hazy.
Cyberbullying, however, typically presents no such haze because the
messages may vent pure spite or personal animosities, but they rarely, if
ever, implicate issues of greater social concern. Phoebe Prince's
cyberbullies, for example, neither intended nor conveyed any message
reasonably characterized as political when they said that she deserved to
die and called her an "Irish slut," a whore, and a druggie in a stream of text
318, 323; J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1101-02, (C.D.
Cal. 2010); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 854-55 (Pa. 2002); In re
Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 742-43; Pangle v. Bend-Lapine Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d 275, 283-87
(Or. Ct. App. 2000).
171. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994)
("It is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must attend."); United
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 706 (1993) (quoting U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins.
Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 463 n.11 (1993) ("[These cases] contain a valuable
reminder about the need to distinguish an opinion's holding from its dicta.")).
172. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007).
173. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-55 (1995) (citing New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)).
174. Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ., 380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901-02 (W.D. Mich. 2005)
(discussing school's discretionary authority to impose discipline is strongest where student
speech does "not concern a political issue or a matter of public concern, as in Tinker" but
rather a "private grievance" or other effort to strike at a particular classmate for personal
reasons).
175. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
205
HeinOnline  -- 37 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 205 2011
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CONFINEMENT
messages, on a Facebookpage, and then in posthumous postings on her
Facebook memorial page.
Under Tinker, face-to-face bullying and cyberbullying constitute non-
political speech that often materially and substantially disrupts the work
and discipline of the school,177 and that almost always produces "collision
with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone." 78 The
remainder of this Part II discusses how the lower courts' application of
these dual Tinker prongs enhances the schools' authority to discipline
cyberbullies.
2. Tinker's "disruption" prong and cyberbullying
Vigilant school authorities sometimes intervene early against
cyberbullying, when a few messages may foreshadow an ongoing barrage.
By authorizing limitations on student speech that reasonably threatens
material and substantial disruption of the school's work, Tinker imposes on
school officials "an affirmative duty to not only ameliorate the harmful
effects of disruptions, but to prevent them from happening in the first
place."' 79 The Seventh Circuit has rejected the contention that "a school is
required to prove that unless the speech at issue is forbidden serious
consequences will in fact ensue. That could rarely be proved. . . . It is
enough for the school to present 'facts which might reasonably lead school
officials to forecast substantial disruption."'
80
The Third Circuit requires "a specific and significant fear of disruption,
not just some remote apprehension of disturbance."' 81 The Second Circuit
has held that school authorities reasonably anticipate material and
substantial disruption where student speech poses "a substantial risk
that ... administrators and teachers would be further diverted from their
core educational responsibilities by the need to dissipate misguided anger
or confusion."1 82
At many public elementary and secondary schools, pervasive
cyberbullying almost naturally produces this diversion by draining
administrators' time and energies from the core mission to provide
effective education. At one suburban New Jersey middle school, for
176. Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 6; Ream, supra note 10.
177. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
178. Id. at 508.
179. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2007); Wisniewski v. Bd. of
Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating a school's authority does not depend on
allegations or proof that the student speaker intended to cause disruption).
180. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 673 (7th
Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
181. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001).
182. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2008).
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example, the seventh-grade guidance counselor reports that she can spend
up to three-quarters of her time mediating student disputes that began with
insults sent online or in text messages; these disputes also distract the
school's principal from other pedagogical responsibilities. 8 3
Once non-political student speech signals such disruption of the school's
work, most lower courts do not set the Tinker bar particularly high. Courts
have held that disruption of a school's work is material and substantial
where it creates, or reasonably threatens to create, "more than a brief, easily
overlooked, de minimis impact." 84 "While school officials must offer facts
to support their proscription of student speech," concludes the Fifth Circuit,
"this is not a 'difficult burden' and 'their decisions will govern' if they are
'within the range where reasonable minds will differ."'185
These tests set an appropriate balance as the United States confronts a
"crisis," perceived for at least the past generation, in the quality and
performance of public education.186 The Supreme Court rightfully views
public education as "perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments."' 87 Because the nation depends on public education to help
sustain leadership in the increasingly global environment marked by swift
technological advances, disruption of a public school's work is material
and substantial whenever students' non-political speech leads the school's
professional educators to divert significant attention from teaching toward
maintaining order and discipline, mediating student disputes, or preventing
or stemming daily violence and recrimination.
Lower courts have found material and substantial disruption where
student speech disturbs or distracts classroom teaching or lesson plans.188
183. Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools Into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/style28bully.html.
184. Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 983 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted); see also J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868 (Pa. 2002)
("[W]hile there must be more than some mild distraction or curiosity created by the speech,
complete chaos is not required.") (citation omitted).
185. A.M. v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
186. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), http://reagan.procon.org/sourcefiles/a-
nation-at-risk-reagan-april-1983.pdf; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMMERCE & CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, A JOINT PLATFORM FOR EDUCATION REFORM (2007), http://www.uschamber.com/
sites/default/files/reports/070227jointplatform.pdf; Molly Peterson, "Staggering" Crisis in
U.S. Education Found in Study (Update 1), BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aP2q7rcjW7Lk; Mortimer B.
Zuckerman, Best and Brightest Teachers Key to Solving U.S. Education Crisis, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/articles/
2011/01/14/best-and-brightest-teachers-key-to-solving-us-education-crisis.
187. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
188. See, e.g., Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Minn. 1987),
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Indeed, proof of such disturbance or distraction would almost certainly
have won for the school district in Tinker itself.189 The finding is also
appropriate where the principal or other administrators must spend a bulk
of their in-school time responding to the reasonable concerns of students or
parents for as little as a week, or communicating with parents who threaten
to remove their children from school.190
In the Seventh Circuit, material and substantial disruption or its
reasonable threat occurs "if there is reason to think that a particular type of
student speech will lead to a decline in students' test scores, an upsurge in
truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school."191 Material and substantial
disruption also occurs where student speech causes one or more teachers
such stress that the school must grant them time away from work and
engage substitute teachers, or where students express anxiety and concern
for their own safety. 192
School authorities exercising discretion may also reasonably conclude
that cyberbullying would disrupt the entire school environment (as it
almost certainly did in Phoebe Prince's case) by encouraging violence,
interrupting teaching, or scaring or demoralizing other students. 193
Researchers have found, for example, that "both bullying and being bullied
are associated with higher rates of weapons carrying, fighting, and fighting
injuries" on and off campus, and that rates of overall school violence
consistently rise with increased bullying. 194
Cyberbullying may lead to fights in school between bullies and victims,
affd, 855 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1988) (table decision) (discussing substantial disruption
established by students reading unofficial newspaper in class); Baker v. Downey City Bd. of
Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (same).
189. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511, 514 (1969); see
also id at 517-18 (Black, J., dissenting) (finding evidence of disruption in the record).
190. Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 1998) (vacating preliminary
injunction in favor of high school student who was expelled for distributing an underground
newspaper that taught students how to hack into the school's computers and published the
school's restricted access codes; school officials had to spend time and energy controlling
the damage); Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1123 (E.D. Mo.
2010).
191. Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th
Cir._2008); see also J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 852, 869 (Pa. 2002)
(upholding disciplining a middle school student whose web site threatened to kill a teacher
and "had a demoralizing impact on the school community").
192. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 852.
193. See, e.g., Dorothy L. Espelage et al., Examining the Social Context of Bullying
Behaviors in Early Adolescence, 78 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 326, 326 (2000); Gwen Glew et
al., Bullying: Children Hurting Children, 21 PEDIATRICS IN REv. 183, 185 (2000).
194. Tonja R. Nansel et al., Relationships Between Bullying and Violence Among U.S.
Youth, 157 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS MED. 348, 353 (2003).
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and sometimes among defenders of each.195 A post-Columbine report by
the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education found that
bullies may not be the only targets of victims bent on disruptive revenge,196
and some researchers conclude that bullying can breed crimes against
students who are not the bully's direct targets.197 Courts have found
material and substantial disruption where the school administration must
increase security, for example by locking access to the school or by
assignin teachers or other school personnel to additional monitoring
duties. I
3. Tinker's "personal security" prong and cyberbullying
Some lower courts perceive the "disruption" prong as the sole basis
for Tinker's holding,199 but other lower courts have perceived that prong
and the "personal security" prong as related yet distinct bases for meeting
what Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Sandra Day O'Connor have called
the schools' obligation "to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children."200 In decisions that created exceptions to Tinker without
applying that decision's standards, the Supreme Court has sent mixed
signals that do not foreclose the issue.201
In accordance with the express terms of Tinker's majority opinion itself,
the two prongs are best viewed as related yet distinct. The "disruption"
prong focuses on actual or reasonably anticipated threats to the school's
educational environment, and the "personal security" prong focuses more
195. Susan Llewelyn Leach, Behind the Surge in Girl Crime, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.,
Sept. 15, 2004, at 16.
196. BRYAN VOSSEKUL ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERVICE & U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., THE
FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
PREVENTION OF SCHOOL ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES 20-21 (2002).
197. Id. at 16.
198. Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1124 (E.D. Mo. 2010).
199. See, e.g., Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 759, 768-70 (9th Cir.
2006); J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1100-01 (C.D. Cal.
2010); Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 650 F. Supp. 2d 811, 819 (E.D. Tenn. 2009).
200. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring); see also,
e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001); Mardis, 684 F.
Supp. 2d at 1122; Gold v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 632 F. Supp. 2d 771, 789 (M.D.
Tenn. 2009); Gillman v. Sch. Bd., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1366-67 (N.D. Fla. 2008); B.W.A.
v. Farmington R-7 Sch. Dist., 508 F. Supp. 2d 740, 747 (E.D. Mo. 2007); Nixon v. Northern
Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969, 972, 974 (S.D. Ohio 2005);
Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ., 380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900 (W.D. Mich. 2005); Flaherty v.
Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 703 (W.D. Pa. 2003); J.S. v. Bethlehem
Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 861-62 (Pa. 2002).
201. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (stating disruption prong);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (stating both prongs).
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directly on actual or reasonably anticipated threats to the physical or
emotional well-being of individual students. Together the two prongs
recognize that, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court puts it, "[s]chool officials
not only educate students who are compelled to attend school, but they
have a responsibility to protect those students ... from behavior that
threatens their safety and the integrity of the learning process." 202
The "personal security" prong is particularly relevant to cyberbullying
because most persistent messages worth disciplining could also subject the
cyberbully to delinquency adjudication or criminal conviction under the
typical harassment statute. Courts generally uphold content-neutral
harassment statutes that focus on the speaker's intent and the target's
reasonable reaction. The statute may criminalize "willful," "malicious," or
similar conduct or speech driven by specific intent; require proof that the
conduct or speech be "directed at" a specific individual; require proof that a
reasonable person would be substantially alarmed, annoyed, or menaced;
apply only to speech or conduct that has "no legitimate purpose"; and
exclude constitutionally protected acts or speech such as public
demonstrations or labor picketing.203
Social science research findings provide persuasive evidence that student
bullying almost always impinges on Tinker's recognized right of students
to be secure and to be let alone in school. The affected students are the
bully's target, bystander students who know about the bullying, and
sometimes even the bullies themselves.
i. The role of social science research findings
Where the school district supports its decision to suspend or expel a
student with proof about social science research findings concerning the
actual and potential harms of cyberbullying to individual students, lower
courts applying Tinker may rely on these findings because the Supreme
Court itself relies on social science findings to decide matters of childhood
202. State v. Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Wis. 1997); see also, e.g., Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 591 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing the state's interest in
"the proper functioning of its public school system for the benefit of all pupils and the
public generally") (emphasis omitted); Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608,
614 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[B]alanc[ing] the First Amendment rights of students with the special
need of educators to maintain a safe and effective learning environment."); Butler v. Rio
Rancho Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he [s]chool has a
legitimate interest in providing a safe environment for students and staff."); Canady v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Educators have an essential
role in regulating school affairs and establishing appropriate standards of conduct."); Busch
v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 623 N.W.2d 672, 678 (Neb. 2001) ("The day-to-day operation of
a school requires that a safe learning environment be provided for students and school
employees.").
203. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welch, 825 N.E.2d 1005, 1018-19 (Mass. 2005).
[Vol. 37:181210
HeinOnline  -- 37 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 210 2011
2011] AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE OFF-CAMPUS BULLYING
and adolescent development. In Maryland v. Craig in 1990, for example,
the Court rejected a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause challenge to a
state statute that permitted child witnesses in child abuse cases to testify at
trial against the defendant, outside the defendant's physical presence, by
one-way closed circuit television.204 To justify the unusual departure from
the Sixth Amendment's requirement of face-to-face confrontation, Craig
credited "the growing body of academic literature documenting the
psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims who must testify in
court." 205
In Roper v. Simmons in 2005, the Court underscored its traditional
"concern for the vulnerability of children"206  by stressing that
"developments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds."207 Roper
credited "scientific and sociological studies" cited by the defendant and
various amici.208
In Graham v. Florida in 2010, the Court held that Roper had
"established" the soundness of these studies concerning childhood and
adolescent development. 209 By citing research presented in amicus briefs
filed by, among other professional organizations, the American Medical
Association and the American Psychological Association, Graham
concluded that "[n]o recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court's
observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles." 210
204. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849-50 (1990).
205. Id. at 855.
206. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (plurality opinion).
207. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569-71 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause prohibits states from executing individuals who were under eighteen when they
committed their capital crimes; crediting research findings (1) that "[a] lack of maturity and
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and
are more understandable among the young"; (2) that "juveniles are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure," partly
because "juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over their own
environment"; and (3) that "the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
adult").
208. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
209. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2016 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70). The Court held
that the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits imposition of
life imprisonment without parole on a defendant who was under eighteen at the time of the
non-homicide crime. Id. at 2015.
210. Id. at 2026 (citing Brief for the Am. Med. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Neither Party at 16-24; Brief for the Am. Psychol. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 22-27); see also Mark Hansen, What's the Matter with Kids Today,
A.B.A. J. 50, 50 (July 2010) ("A Revolution in Thinking About Children's Minds Is
Sparking Change in Juvenile Justice.").
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ii. Social science research findings concerning bullying
a. Victims
Pediatric professionals recognize bullying as a form of child abuse,
perpetrated by other children rather than by adults.211 Researchers have
found that bullying can lead victims to suffer school phobia, increased
truancy, or impaired concentration and classroom achievement. 212 Victims
may be at greater risk of dropping out of high school before graduation, 2 13
and may display psychosomatic symptoms resembling ones suffered by
many child abuse victims, including sleep disturbances, bedwetting,
abdominal pain, high levels of anxiety and depression, loneliness, low self-
esteem, and heightened fear for personal safety. 214
Face-to-face bullying may leave bruises or other physical
manifestations, but cyberbullying unknown to the victim's parents or other
adults can work its psychic damage undetected for weeks or months. A
victim's plight may be particularly severe because a few keystrokes can
inflict hurt sometimes even more severe than fists or playground
211. See, e.g., Susan P. Limber, Addressing Youth Bullying Behaviors, in AM. MED.
Ass'N, EDUCATION FORUM ON ADOLESCENT HEALTH: YOUTH BULLYING, 5, 6 (2002);
Richard Goldbloom, Children's Inhumanity to Children, 144 J. PEDIATRICS 3, 3 (2004);
Kirsti Kumpulainen et al., Bullying and Psychiatric Symptoms Among Elementary School-
Age Children, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 705, 706 (1998); Olweus, supra note 38, at
1173.
212. See, e.g., Tanya Beran & Qing Li, Cyber-Harassment: A Study of a New Method
for an Old Behavior, 32 J. EDUC. COMPUTING RES. 265, 272 (2005) (showing sadness,
anxiety, fear and an inability to concentrate that affected grades); Gwen M. Glew et al.,
Bullying, Psychosocial Adjustment, and Academic Performance in Elementary School, 159
ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 1026, 1030 (2005); Kumpulainen et al., supra
note 206, at 715; Michele L. Ybarra et al., Examining the Overlap in Internet Harassment
and School Bullying: Implications for School Intervention, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH, S42,
S46 (2007) (truancy).
213. See Kris Bosworth et al., Factors Associated with Bullying Behavior in Middle
School Students, 19 J. EARLY ADOLESCENCE 341, 341 (1999).
214. See Louise Arseneault et al., Bullying Victimization Uniquely Contributes to
Adjustment Problems in Young Children: A Nationally Representative Cohort Study, 118
PEDIATRICS 130, 131, 136 (2006); Minne Fekkes et al., Bullying Behavior and Associations
with Psychosomatic Complaints and Depression in Victims, 144 J. PEDIATRICS 17, 21
(2004); Gianluca Gini & Tiziana Pozzoli, Association Between Bullying and Psychosomatic
Problems: A Meta-analysis, 123 PEDIATRICS 1059, 1063-64 (2009); Glew et al., supra note
207, at 1030-31; Mason, supra note 31, at 325, 327-28; Justin W. Patchin & Sameer
Hinduja, Cyberbullying and Self-Esteem, 80 J. SCH. HEALTH 614, 619 (2010) ("Experience
with cyberbullying, both as a victim and as an offender, was associated with significantly
lower levels of self-esteem, even after controlling for demographic differences."); Gitanjali
Saluja et al., Prevalence of and Risk Factors for Depressive Symptoms Among Young
Adolescents, 158 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 760, 761-62, 764 (2004).
[Vol. 37:181212
HeinOnline  -- 37 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 212 2011
2011] AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE OFF-CAMPUS BULLYING
confrontations. Internet postings can hound victims around the clock at
home, where they are supposed to feel safe,215 and can leave them feeling
"tethered to their tormenters." 216 "If someone is picking on you in the
school yard, you can go home," said the mother of a thirteen-year-old
Virginia boy who committed suicide with a shotgun after cyberbullies
taunted him about his small size and dared him to kill himself for more
than a month.217 "When it's on the computer at home, you have nowhere to
go."218
"Cyberspace creates an illusion of invisibility because it is faceless." 219
Because the victim's body language and tone of voice disappear,
researchers doubt that some cyberbullies even summon empathy to
recognize the potential destructiveness of their conduct. 220 Virulence may
escalate because of what psychologists call "moral disengagement"-
"[t]he further removed we are from the consequences of our actions, the
easier it is to emotionally separate ourselves from our own behavior." 221 In
2003, for example, thirteen-year-old Vermont middle schooler Ryan
Halligan hanged himself at home after two ears of cyberbullying by
students who urged him to take his own life.2 2 It is difficult to imagine
whether Ryan's cyberbullies thought seriously about the potential
consequences of what they were doing. In his final instant message, Ryan
typed, "Tonight's the night," and the reply came back, "It's about time." 223
Face-to-face bullying and cyberbullying normally share at least one
common denominator: most victims are no match emotionally for the
bullies. If the playing field were level, chances are that the victim would
not be bullied in the first place. The victim may be a student coping with
depression, special mental health needs, or social isolation.224 Similarly
215. Mishna et al., supra note 33, at 1224.
216. Darby Dickerson, Cyberbullies On Campus, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 51, 56 n.44
(2005) (quoting Glenn R. Stutzky, school violence expert, Michigan State University).
217. Meadows et al., supra note 39.
218. Id.
219. Mason, supra note 32, at 329.
220. Id; see also Peter K. Smith et al., Cyberbullying: Its Nature and Impact in
Secondary School Pupils, 49 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 376, 383 (2009) (noting
cyberbullying can "reduce any inhibition of inflicting pain due to empathy at seeing the
victim's distress").
221. Adam Hanft, Internet and Social Media Behavior 101, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., May
28, 2010, at 1; see also Mason, supra note 32, at 329.
222. M. Mindy Moretti, Playground Bullying Heads to Cyberspace, 37 CouNTY NEWS
1, 1 (2005), http://www.naco.org/newsroom/countynews/archives/documents/2005/cnews-
jan3l-05.pdf.
223. Id at 3.
224. Minne Fekkes et al., Do Bullied Children Get Ill, or Do Ill Children Get Bullied?
A Prospective Cohort Study on the Relationship Between Bullying and Health-Related
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inviting targets are children who attract attention for such reasons as
perceived sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, gender, physical or emotional
disability, obesity, small size, or difficulties with social skills. 2 2 5
Researchers have even identified a link between bullying and children with
special physical health needs such as speech or language impairment,
vision problems, cancer, cerebral palsy, diabetes or muscular dystrophy. 226
The suicides of Phoebe Prince and Carl Joseph Walker-Hoover in
Massachusetts and Ryan Halligan in Vermont were not typical, but they
were also not unique. Researcher Dan Olweus found that "victims'
devaluation of themselves sometimes becomes so overwhelming that they
see suicide as the only possible solution" to bullying.227 Other bullying
victims may harbor suicidal thoughts that diminish enjoyment of daily life
even when they do not ripen into suicide attempts. 228 Recent studies have
found depression and suicide ideation common among nine to thirteen-
year-old boys and girls victimized by bullying.2 2 9
"Bullycide" is fast becoming a term of art in educational circles. 230
Symptoms, 117 PEDIATRICS 1568, 1568 (2006) ("Children with depressive symptoms had a
significantly higher chance of being newly victimized, as did children with anxiety.");
Jeanne Van Cleave & Matthew M. Davis, Bullying and Peer Victimization Among Children
with Special Health Care Needs, 118 PEDIATRICS e1212, e1212 (2006).
225. JODI LIPSON, AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS:
BULLYING, TEASING, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL 24-25 (2001),
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED454132.pdf; Ian Janssen et al., Associations Between
Overweight and Obesity With Bullying Behaviors in School-Aged Children, 113 PEDIATRICS
1187, 1187 (2004); Young Shin Kim et al., School Bullying and Youth Violence, 63
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1035, 1039-40 (2006); Kumpulainen et al., supra note 206, at
713-14; Julie C. Lumeng et al., Weight Status as a Predictor of Being Bullied in Third
Through Sixth Grades, 125 PEDIATRICS 1301, 1301 (2010) ("Children who are obese are
more likely to be bullied, regardless of a number of potential sociodemographic, social, and
academic confounders."); Piek et al., supra note 37; Jin Wang et al., Bullying Victimization
Among Underweight and Overweight US. Youth: Differential Associations for Boys and
Girls, 47 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 99, 100-01 (2010).
226. See, e.g., Limber, supra note 211, at 9-10; Van Cleve, supra note 224, at e 1216-
17.
227. Olweus, supra note 38, at 1182-83.
228. See, e.g., Fekkes et al., supra note 214, at 17; Peter K. Smith, The Silent
Nightmare: Bullying and Victimisation in School Peer Groups, 4 PSYCHOLOGIST 243, 245
(1991).
229. Marcel F. van der Wal et al., Psychosocial Health Among Young Victims and
Offenders of Direct and Indirect Bullying, 111 PEDIATRICS 1312, 1312 (2003); Mason,
supra note 31, at 325.
230. WALTER B. ROBERTS, JR., WORKING WITH PARENTS OF BULLIES AND VICTIMS 14
(2008) ("Acts of suicide when those who feel that they have no other solution to their
torment except via 'escaping' personal pain kill themselves."); see also SAMEER HINDUJA &
JUsTIN W. PATCHIN, BULLYING BEYOND THE SCHOOLYARD: PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO
CYBERBULLYING 66 (2009) ("cyberbullicide"); Ollove, supra note 2. See generally NEIL
[Vol. 37:181214
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Researchers do not know the precise number of bullying victims who are
driven to contemplate or attempt suicide, but what researchers do know
reinforces studies that find "compelling reasons to associate at least some
of the child and adolescent risk for suicidal thoughts and actions to school
bullying."231 Half the nation's forty-nine million elementary and secondary
students, for example, suffer face-to-face or cyberbullying at some time
before leaving high school; a victim may endure bullying for weeks,
months, or even years;232 and suicide is the third leading cause of death
among American adolescents. 233 As researchers intimate, the lines likely
cross often.
"Bullying is not the only risk factor for suicidal thoughts and behaviors,
but it surely now must be added to the list."234 Even if cyberbullying is
only one cause among others, the numbers are daunting. The United States
had 1231 suicides of children between the ages of five and eighteen in
2007,235 and the numbers show no signs of falling. In a 2009 nationwide
survey by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 26.1% of
high school students said they felt so sad or hopeless every day for two
consecutive weeks in the prior month that they stopped doing some usual
activities. 236 During the twelve months preceding the survey, 10.9% of
students had planned how they would attempt suicide, 6.3% of students had
actually attempted suicide one or more times, and 1.9% of students had
made a suicide attempt that resulted in an injury, poisoning, or overdose
that required treatment by a physician or nurse.237 These alarming
predictors may be underestimates because medical experts believe that
MARR & TIM FIELD, BULLYCIDE: DEATH AT PLAYTIME (2001).
231. Young Shin Kim et al., School Bullying and Suicidal Risk In Korean Middle
School Students, 115 PEDIATRICs 357, 357-58 (2005) (presenting U.S. findings and citing
other studies reaching similar conclusions); see also, e.g., Anat Brunstein Klomek, Bullying,
Depression, and Suicidality in Adolescents, 46 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 40, 47 (2007) (finding that depression, serious suicidal ideation, and suicide
attempts are "significantly associated with" bullying behavior among high school students).
232. See Amie E. Grills & Thomas H. Ollendick, Peer Victimization, Global Self-
Worth, and Anxiety in Middle School Children, 31 J. CLINICAL CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHOL. 59, 60 (2002). Olweus, supra note 37, at 1182. See generally Susan P. Limber &
Maury M. Nation, Bullying Among Children and Youth, (Apr. 1998), http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/
jjbulletin/9804/bullying2.html.
233. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, SUICIDE: FACTS AT A GLANCE 2
(2010), http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention//pdflSuicide-DataSheet-a.pdf
234. Kim et al., supra note 231, at 361.
235. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2010,
at iii (2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdflisesI0.pdf.
236. DANICE EATON ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, YOUTH
RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEILLANCE-UNITED STATES, 2009, 8 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov.
mmwr/pdf/ss/ss5905.pdf.
237. Id. at 9.
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many child and adolescent deaths reported as "accidental" are in fact
suicides. 238
Social science research thus demonstrates how cyberbulling's
"electronic aggression" 239 can compromise educational opportunity and
endanger the physical and emotional health of student victims. States
guarantee children the right to a free public education, and they maintain
compulsory education statutes and truancy proceedings to compel
attendance by children who do not attend private schools or receive home
schooling. 240 "[F]reedom from fear of bullying," concludes a leading
researcher, "is not enough to ensure successful learning but it is a necessary
condition for effective learning." 241
b. Bystanders
Bystanders-students who watch or hear about face-to-face bullying or
cyberbullying of classmates-have been called "secondary victims." 242 The
audience may be physical or virtual, but bystanders may suffer emotional
or physical insecurity regardless of whether they remain on the sidelines,
join the bullying, or defend the victim.
Most student bystanders do not intervene on a victim's behalf or report
the bullying to an adult; the normal response is to avoid associating with
the victim, or even to join the bully in an effort to boost the bystander's
own social position or to avoid being targeted.243 One study found that
85% of bullying incidents had student bystanders, but that bystanders
intervened for the victim in only 10% of the incidents.244 Non-intervention,
common in cases of face-to-face bullying, can be even more likely in cases
of cyberbullying, whose potentially larger virtual audience can "accelerate
mob behavior."245 Regardless of the medium, bullies wield real or
perceived power, and (as we know from incidents of adults who recoiled
from aiding victims during perpetration of violent crime)246 publically
238. Leon Eisenberg, The Epidemiology of Suicide in Adolescents, 13 PEDIATRIC
ANNALS 47, 47 (1984).
239. Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 33; see also Mishna et al.,
supra note 32, at 1222-27 ("online social cruelty").
240. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-75 (1975).
241. Bosworth et al., supra note 213, at 342.
242. Linda R. Jeffrey, Bullying Bystanders, 11 PREVENTION RESEARCHER 7, 7 (2004).
243. Amelia Kohm et al., What Do Bystanders Do When Children Are Being Bullied. .
And Why Do They Do It?, 108 ISSuE BRIEF 1, 1-2 (2006), http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/
default/files/publications/ChapinHallDocument_4.pdf.
244. Rona S. Atlas & Debra J. Pepler, Observations ofBullying in the Classroom, 92 J.
EDUC. RES. 86, 92 (1998); Jeffrey, supra note 242.
245. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REv. 61, 62 (2009).
246. Moseley v. Scully, 908 F. Supp. 1120, 1123, 1142 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying writ
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stepping forward takes courage.
Meekness may weaken bystanders' empathy for the distress of others,
and may damage bystanders' schoolwork and self-esteem by inducing
lasting guilt about timidity and lack of resolve in the face of a classmate's
overt victimization. A few nights after Phoebe Prince's suicide, a student-
organized candlelight vigil on the school's softball field drew hundreds,
including many students who likely had known about the face-to-face and
cyberbullying that she had endured in the prior weeks and months.247 4q
wish I could have stopped [the suicide]," said a fourteen-year-old boy who
planned to take Phoebe to the winter dance two nights later. "I wish I could
have talked to her when she got home." 248 The reactions came from the
heart, but they came too late and likely will endure.
c. Bullies
Bullies hold the same right to a free public education as other students,
and researchers conclude that bullies "may need help as much as their
victims." 249 Bullies undisciplined by the school and overlooked by other
public agencies in the pediatric safety system "experience poor
psychosocial and emotional adjustment, difficulty making friends, and
increased loneliness." 250 Bullying may signal generally antisocial,
aggressive, and even delinquent and criminal conduct that can escalate
throughout adolescence and adulthood.251 "[B]ullies have a more positive
of habeas corpus to defendant who committed "one of the most infamous and brutal murders
committed this century, which shocked the nation when it was committed in 1964, and
continues to trouble the public today. ... the 1964 murder of Katherine 'Kitty' Genovese in
Queens, New York 'symbolized urban apathy [since] 38 people heard her screams but did
nothing."') (quoting N.Y. L.J., July 25, 1995, at 1, col. 1.), aff'd, 104 F.3d 356 (2d Cir.
1996); A.M. ROSENTHAL, THIRTY-EIGHT WITNESSES: THE KITTY GENOVESE CASE (Univ. of
Cal. Press 1999) (1964) (discussing the Kitty Genovese murder case in which none of the
thirty-eight witnesses came to her aid); Martin Gansburg, Thirty-Eight Who Saw Murder
Didn't Call the Police, N.Y. TiMEs,_Mar. 27, 1964, at Al (reporting the Genovese murder).
247. Kathy McCabe, Teen's Suicide Prompts a Look at Bullying, Bos. GLOBE (Jan. 24,
2010), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/01/24/teens-suicide
prompts a look at bullying/.
248. David Usborne, U.S. Campaigners Take on High-School Bullies After Irish Girl is
Driven to Despair, THE INDEPENDENT (London) (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/world/americas/us-campaigners-take-on-highschool-bullies-after-irish-girl-is-
driven-to-despair- 1931659.html.
249. Goldbloom, supra note 211.
250. Saluja et al., supra note 214, at 761; see also Mason, supra note 32, at 327-28;
Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 214.
251. AM. MED. Ass'N, Report: Bullying Behaviors Among Children and Adolescents
(2002), www.ama-assn.org/meetings/public/annual02/csa-reports.pdf; see also, e.g., DAN
OLWEUS, BULLYING AT SCHOOL: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE CAN Do 35-36 (1993);
van der Wal, supra note 229; Michele L. Ybarra & Kimberly J. Mitchell, Prevalence and
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attitude towards violence than students in general," often have "a strong
need to dominate others," and "seem to enjoy ... subdu[ing] others."22
Bullies may sense that violence, intimidation, or degradation are
acceptable, or at least tolerable, ways to impose their will on others,
including future dating partners, spouses, children, neighbors, or co-
workers. 53 Some studies have shown that one in four boys who bully will
have a criminal record before they turn thirty. 254 At least one researcher has
even reported that bullying can be inter-generational: "Adolescent bullies
tend to become adult bullies and then tend to have children who are
bullies." 255
Some observers might hold misgivings about the public schools'
obligation to protect cyberbullies from the short-term and long-term
personal consequences of their own conduct. The bottom line, grounded in
social science research, however, is that even cyberbullies themselves can
benefit when the school disciplines their virtual speech that is designed to
inflict "willful and repeated harm" on targeted classmates. 256
III. THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS' AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE STUDENT
CYBERBULLYING SENT FROM OFF CAMPUS
A. The Tinker Doctrine and Technology: Lessons from Olmstead
(1928)
1. The state of the law
In 2010, the New York Times reported about suburban New York parents
who begged the local public elementary school to protect their sixth-grade
daughter from repeated sexually ex licit threats sent from the cell phone of
a twelve-year-old boy in her class. 57 The threats "occurred out of school,
on a weekend," responded the principal, "[w]e can't discipline him."258
Like Phoebe Prince, Carl Joseph Walker-Hoover, and thousands of other
vulnerable cyberbullying victims left unprotected in school by teachers and
Frequency of Internet Harassment Instigation: Implications for Adolescent Health, 41 J.
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 189, 189 (2007).
252. Olweus, supra note 38, at 1180-81.
253. See, e.g., Kumpulainen et al., supra note 211; Rolf Loeber & Dale Hay, Key
Issues In the Development ofAggression and Violence From Childhood to Early Adulthood,
48 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 371, 378 (1997); Smith, supra note 228.
254. Limber, supra note 211, at 1.
255. David P. Farrington, Understanding and Preventing Bullying, 17 CRIME & JUST.
381, 383 (1993).
256. Justin W. Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Bullies Move Beyond the Schoolyard: A
Preliminary Look at Cyberbullying, 4 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUv. JusT. 148, 152 (2006).
257. Hoffman, supra note 183.
258. Id.
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administrators, the girl likely continued to suffer in the classroom, on the
campus, and at home. The principal was wrong. Because the technology
that supports cyberbullying is so new, the Supreme Court and state
supreme courts have yet to decide the public schools' authority to
discipline cyberbullies for messages sent from off-campus. Despite "some
uncertainty" 259 in the case law, however, "[t]he overwhelming weight of
authority has analyzed student speech (whether on or off campus) in
accordance with Tinker,"260 provided that the school handbook provides
appropriate notice to students and their parents, 261 that the cyberbully
receives procedural due process guaranteed in the handbook and by the
Constitution, 262 and that the record demonstrates the harm recited by one or
both prongs of that decision.263 The message's off-campus origins are not
determinative because most courts recognize that "off-campus conduct can
create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a school." 264
259. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007).
260. Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001);
see also, J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1104 (C.D. Cal.
2010) ("substantial weight of authority").
261. See, e.g., Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ., 380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 (W.D. Mich. 2005)
(upholding discipline of student whose speech violated student handbook provisions that the
court held constitutional); Flaherty v. Keystone Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 705-
06 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (striking down discipline of high school student because the student
handbook did not limit the school's disciplinary authority to conduct that occurred on school
premises or that related to school activities).
262. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581, 584 (1975) (stating that the state
guarantees children a free public education, public school students have a due process
property interest in that guarantee and a liberty interest in not having their reputations
sullied by suspension for less than good cause; where a student faces suspension for less
than ten days, however, due process requires only "an informal give-and-take between
student and disciplinarian").
263. See, e.g., Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D.
Mich. 2002) (holding that school violated student's First Amendment rights by disciplining
him for website created off campus because the record contained no evidence of disruption
to the school); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (holding that the school violated student's
First Amendment rights by disciplining him for criticizing the school's athletic director by
email sent from his home computer because the school "failed to adduce any evidence of
actual disruption" of the school's work); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088,
1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (holding that school violated student's First Amendment rights by
disciplining him for website created off campus with "no evidence" that the site created a
threat); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp._2d 1175, 1181-82 (E.D. Mo.
1998) (holding that the school violated student's First Amendment rights by disciplining
him for website created off campus).
264. O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs., No. CV 08-5671 ODW, 2008 WL 4396895, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 9, 2008); see also, e.g., Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 ("not
material") (citations omitted); Cohn v. New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F. Supp. 2d 421, 436
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The simple fact that conduct occurs off school grounds 'does not
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Before applying the Tinker Doctrine, some lower courts assume the
school's disciplinary authority over messages transmitted from off-campus
that foreseeably produce targeted harm on campus. 265 Other decisions
discuss this authority before conferring it. In Doninger v. Niehoff for
example, the Second Circuit explained that in the twenty-first century, "off-
campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption
within a school" 266 because "students both on and off campus routinely
participate in school affairs ... via blog postings, instant messaging, and
other forms of electronic communication."267
Doninger rejected the First Amendment speech claims of a student who,
on a blog from her home, posted a vulgar message about a school
administrator identified by name in the message.268 After concluding that
the school could have disciplined the student if she had distributed hard
copies of the message in school, the court of appeals concluded that "a
student may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring
off school grounds, when this conduct 'would foreseeably create a risk of
preclude the possibility that such conduct . . . may adversely affect the educative process or
endanger the health, safety or morals for pupils within the education system for which the
school authorities are responsible."' (citation omitted)); Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist.,
684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1118 (E.D. Mo. 2010) ("Several [federal] courts of appeal . . . have
applied 'school speech' law to cases where the communications occurred off school grounds
but their effects reverberated to the classroom.") (citations omitted).
265. See, e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying
Tinker without considering that student composed his violent poem outside of school);
Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 827-28 (7th Cir. 1998);
Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1075-77 (5th Cir. 1973) (student
disciplined for writing article printed in underground newspaper published off-campus);
Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970-71 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying Tinker to
student underground newspaper written and distributed off the high school campus but
brought to the campus); Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098, 1102-03
(disciplining student's YouTube posting of a video clip demeaning a classmate) (citations
omitted); 0.7., 2008 WL 4396895, at *4 (disciplining student-created video, posted on the
Internet, showing graphic dramatization of a teacher's murder); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at
455 (describing student-created abusive "Top-Ten" list distributed off-campus by email);
Pangle v. Bend-Lapine Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d 275, 285-86 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (disciplining
student-created underground newsletter distributed on campus); Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at
1090 (disciplining student-created website with mock obituaries of some classmates);
Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (disciplining student-created website with criticism of
school authorities).
266. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd.
of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007)).
267. Id. at 49; see also, e.g., Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1118; J.S. v. Bethlehem Area
Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Pa. 2002) ("Tinker's simple armband[s], worn silently and
brought into a . . . classroom, has been replaced by . . . complex multi-media website[s],
accessible to fellow students, teachers, and the world").
268. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 41, 45, 53.
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substantial disruption within the school environment,' at least when it was
similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach
campus." 269
2. Olmstead redux
Where a lower court applies the Tinker doctrine to off-campus student
speech transmitted electronically through technology that the Supreme
Court had no reason to anticipate when it created and refined that doctrine,
the court remains true to the doctrine's express holdings. Contemporary
application also avoids the jurisprudential gymnastics that may attend
unwillingness to apply established constitutional principles to technology
reasonably unanticipated. The Court's ultimate overruling of its 1928
decision in Olmstead v. United States informs the issue.270
Olmstead held, five-to-four, that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit
the government from intercepting telephone conversations by wiretaps
installed outside the conversants' homes.271 The slender majority
concluded that the government had not done a search or seizure because
"[t]he evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that
only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants." 272
Justice Louis D. Brandeis dissented from Olmstead's refusal to apply
Fourth Amendment doctrine to technological advances wrought by the
advent of the telephone. The Court had often sustained the government's
constitutional authority "over objects of which the [f]athers could not have
dreamed," 273 said Justice Brandeis, who found it "immaterial where the
physical connection with the telephone wires leading into the defendants'
premises was made." 274 Because "[t]ime works changes, brings into
existence new conditions and purposes," he concluded, "a principle to be
vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth."275
The passage of years vindicated the Brandeis position. In Berger v. New
York in 1967, the Court finally acknowledged that Fourth Amendment
doctrine "has not kept pace with . .. advances in scientific knowledge." 276
269. Id. at 48 (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40).
270. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
271. Id. at 464.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 479.
275. Id. at 472-73; see also, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 885 (1982)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment, as with other parts of the Constitution,
must deal with new problems in a changing world.").
276. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967).
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In Katz v. United States, the Court overruled Olmstead because "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.... To read the Constitution more
narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to
play in private communications." 277
Much as the capacity for government wiretapping of telephones from
remote locations lay beyond the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment's
framers in the early 1790s, the capacity for student cyberbullying from the
Internet and other remote locations lay beyond the Supreme Court's
contemplation when it articulated and later refined Tinker's First
Amendment Doctrine. By upholding the public schools' authority to
discipline cyberbullying that originates from off-campus, lower courts heed
Justice Brandeis' reasoned voice, long since vindicated, that it is
"immaterial where the physical connection ... was made" because "[t]ime
works changes." 278
Perhaps most important, applying the Tinker Doctrine to cyberbullying
also recognizes that the First Amendment in the public schools, like the
Fourth Amendment in the greater society, "protects people, not places." 279
The recognition is particularly critical to public education because the
"people" the doctrine protects are schoolchildren, typically including the
school's most vulnerable children once cyberbullies have drawn their
targets.
B. Applying Fraser to Cyberbullying
The wisdom of applying established Supreme Court doctrine to new
technologies relates not only to Tinker's "disruption" and "personal
security" prongs, but also to Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,
which permits the public schools to discipline lewd, indecent, or vulgar
student speech laden with sexual innuendo. 280 Fraser acknowledged that
"[t]he First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult public
discourse," but rejected the disciplined student's contention that "the same
latitude must be permitted to children in a public school."281 Two years
later, dictum in Kuhlmeier advanced Fraser for the proposition that "[a]
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic
educational mission,' even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school."282
277. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
278. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472, 479; see also J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist.,
711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that the off-campus origins of
cyberbullying are "not material" where the message has the requisite effect on-campus).
279. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
280. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986).
281. Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
282. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1988) (emphasis
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Lower courts have applied Fraser to a wide range of student speech
deemed vulgar, even if not overtly sexual in nature.283 Citing the territorial
language italicized above, however, the relatively few lower courts
reaching the issue have held or assumed that the decision applies only to
speech that the student actually utters inside the school building.284
Olmstead's lineage demonstrates persuasively that courts remain faithful
to Fraser by applying that decision's holding to remote student speech that
foreseeably reaches the school campus. For one thing, the language
italicized above distinguished between the "school," where educators
exercise a "custodial and tutelary" role,285 and "the government" outside of
school; the distinction plausibly suggests that the latter category describes
merely what Fraser itself called "matters of adult public discourse." 286
First Amendment regulation of such adult matters has been narrower than
its regulation of children's activities ever since Prince v. Massachusetts in
1944.287
Applying Fraser to cyberbullying is also appropriate in light of that
decision's lengthy, indeed passionate, embrace of the school's "basic
educational mission":288 to teach "the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior," 289 "habits and manners of civility,"290 and respect for "the
sensibilities of fellow students." 291 When a student communication directed
at a particular classmate foreseeably reaches inside the school building,
fulfillment of the educational mission does not depend on where the
communication originated.
Phoebe Prince's cyberbullies, for example, used Facebook repeatedly to
call her an "Irish slut," a whore, and a druggie. 292 With documentary
evidence, this language would likely provide the school a constitutional
predicate for imposing discipline under Fraser, without having to prove
added).
283. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008) (examining
student's electronic posting "in which [a student] called school administrators douchebags"
and urged classmates to "piss [the superintendent] off more"); Posthumus v. Bd. of Educ.,
380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895, 901 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (describing an incident where a student
called the assistant principal a "dick").
284. See, e.g., J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1109
(C.D. Cal. 2010).
285. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).
286. Fraser, 487 U.S. at 682.
287. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
288. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
289. Id. at 681.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Eckholm & Zezima, supra note 6.
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disruption of the school's work under Tinker.293
IV. CONCLUSION
"In an age when the home and church play a diminishing role in shaping
the character and value judgments of the young," wrote Justice Powell a
generation ago, "a heavier responsibility falls upon the schools." 294
Teachers and administrators frequently assume responsibility not only as
classroom instructors, but also as counselors, confidantes, psychologists,
hygienists, nutritionists, and various other authority figures essential to the
growth and development of an entire generation of children.295
When parents-4he primary agents in the pediatric safety system-falter
in preventing and responding effectively to cyberbullying, professionals
who teach the young assume additional responsibilities as protectors, cyber
ethicists, and disciplinarians. "Without a safe and secure environment, a
school is unable to fulfill its basic purpose of providing an education." 296
The public schools' response to bullying begins with prevention curricula
because "fairly consistent evidence suggests that children's bullyin
behavior can be significantly reduced by well-planned interventions."2
Amid the growth of cyberbullying in the age of technology, schools cannot
reasonably expect to discipline their way out of the "public health
problem." 298 Goals must remain realistic, however, because bullying-
prevention efforts cannot eliminate all incidents, any more than criminal
statutes can eliminate all incidents of the conduct they target. Reduction,
the most realistic aspiration of prevention efforts, spares many student
cyberbullying victims, who will likely not even know of their good
fortune.2 99
For acts of cyberbullying that elude prevention efforts and land in court
293. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
294. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
295. See, e.g., Rogliano v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 347 S.E.2d 220, 226 (W. Va.
1986) ("[T]eachers are not merely instructors in sciences and letters. They are authority
figures, role models, behavioral examples, surrogate parents.").
296. Cobb v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 619 S.E.2d 274, 289 (W. Va. 2005)
(quoting Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909, 910 (W. Va.
1996)); see also Prepared Remarks of President Barack Obama: Back to School Event (Sept.
8, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/MediaResources/PreparedSchoolRemarks ("Maybe
you'll decide to stand up for kids who are being teased or bullied because of who they are or
how they look, because you believe, like I do, that all kids deserve a safe environment to
study and learn.").
297. Rachel C. Vreeman & Aaron E. Carroll, A Systematic Review of School-Based
Interventions to Prevent Bullying, 161 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 78, 87
(2007).
298. See supra note 33.
299. See generally Abrams, supra note 19, at 410-23.
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following imposition of discipline, Tinker's two related yet distinct prongs
"balance some students' rights to free speech with 'the rights of other
students to be secure and to be let alone,' taking into account the authority
of school officials to maintain the discipline and learning environment
necessary to accomplish the school's educational mission." oo Regardless
of whether the cyberbully's messages originate from on-campus or
elsewhere, the Tinker Doctrine confers constitutional authority on the
public schools to discipline student expression that causes, or reasonably
threatens, (1) "substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities," 301 or (2) "collision with the rights of other students to be secure
and to be let alone." 302 Application of Fraser provides yet another potent
basis for disciplining cyberbullying that descends into lewdness, indecency,
or vulgarity.
More than a generation ago, the Supreme Court observed that "while the
Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a
suicide pact."303 Neither should the Constitution be a pact with suicide.
Cyberbullying victims do not typically choose suicide, but they choose it
more often than society should tolerate. The principles underlying the First
Amendment are best served by recognizing that students need "to feel safe
in school and to be spared the oppression and repeated, intentional
humiliation implied in bullying." 304 These principles are disserved by
constitutional interpretations that would relegate professional educators to
the sidelines, disabled from protecting distressed children from non-
political messages that classmates undeterred by prevention efforts transmit
to inflict "willful and repeated harm." 305
The Tinker Doctrine provides a matrix that authorizes the public
schools to convey, in Justice Powell's words, "an early understanding of
the relevance to the social compact of respect for the rights of others." 306
"No student," says pioneering anti-bullying researcher Dan Olweus,
"should be afraid of going to school for fear of being harassed or degraded,
and no parent should need to worry about such things happening to his or
her child!" 307
300. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
301. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
302. Id. at 508.
303. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
304. Olweus, supra note 37, at 1183.
305. Patchin & Hinduja, supra note 214.
306. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
307. Olweus, supra note 38; see also, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2637
(2007) (Alito, J., concurring) ("Most parents, realistically, have no choice but to send their
children to a public school.").
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